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ABSTRACT
The philosophical definition of violence today is “incomplete” and leaves 
a “gap” between the phenomenon and the concept. This is due to the 
fact that the concept of “violence” was/is strangely included in the general 
philosophical categorial line. In domestic and Western discourse, the 
problem field of violence contains, above all, political and ethical meanings. 
The problem is intuitively resolved in its appeal to the concept of “power”, 
which turns out to be philosophically lost in modern philosophy. Only 
exceptionally do we find “traces” of this concept in philosophical works. 
Among them are the works of Aristotle, which need to be freed from 
modern, distorting interpretations. Thus, in the translations of Aristotle, 
the Greek δύναμις, used for the traditional transferring the category of 
possibility, lost its meaning of force (movement, ability, function); in its 
turn, “force” lost relation to “violence” (βια) and “necessity”. Violence is 
understood as a kind of necessity, which is associated with the suppression 
of one’s “own decision”, freedom, something that “prevents desire” and 
contrary to “common thinking,” as well as the absence of “good”. Violence 
is presented not only in an ontological sense, but also existentially, as 
the opposite of “good” and of one’s own “desire”. Force remains in the 
shadow of “necessity” as “possibility”, “potential energy” and “movement”, 
and violence loses the opposition that has arisen in an ontological mode.
Initially, we turned to the hermeneutics of Aristotle’s texts in the existing Rus-
sian translations, trying to give our own understanding of violence in the mod-
ern philosophical context because of its categorical insufficiency. Philosophi-
cal categorization presupposes an initial definition of the phenomenon to be 
interpreted, but the existing conceptual forms turned out to be “insufficient”. 
These forms left a certain “gap” between the phenomenon and the concept of 
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It was intuitively clear that the categorical links “human beings – violence”, 
“violence – being”, “violence – non-violence” are implicitly contained in the 
historical and philosophical categorical context. Not only in the Russian but 
also in Western public (and scientific) discourse, the problematic field of violence 
was burdened primarily with political and ethical meanings: political apology 
or ethical critique of violence. In post-Soviet philosophy, after the victory of 
the first Russian “velvet” revolution in August 1991 in the area of the Garden 
Ring and the White House, and the suppression of the first subcultural “col-
ored” (“red-brown”) revolution in 1993, “violence” turned out to be concep-
tually connected with “non-violence” and ethical exposure of these concepts 
(Гусейнов 2011: 9). In this respect, the concept of violence by A.A. Guseinov 
was a representative for those times. It was developed in the spirit of the eth-
ics of non-violence, containing certain formal and logical contradictions. He 
rightly connected “violence” and “non-violence” with “force”, distinguishing 
them (ibid: 79). Guseinov interpreted “non-violence” as “positive, constructive 
force” and “violence” as “destructive and self-destructive force”. In addition 
to the concepts of “violence” and “non-violence”, there was a positive pres-
ence of the concept of “force” (as marginal one), which unfortunately resided 
in the space of ethical connotations. And it remained unclear: are “violence” 
and “power” always “evil”? Is “nonviolence” a “force” or not? 
There has clearly revealed some unconscious political rationalizations, which 
are often found in ethical doctrines of violence and non-violence. To show all 
the contradictions in the definitions of the concept of “violence” through the 
concept of “non-violence”, a concept that is even more burdened with met-
aphorical, existential, political and ideological meanings, is fraught not only 
with the danger of “moralizing”, but also with a radical going beyond bound-
aries of scientific and philosophical categorizations.
We tried to proceed from the meanings of our native Russian language, but 
here we also found out that in common usage the term “nasilie” often carries a 
“negative assessment load”, but its language meanings are not exhausted – in 
living and historical languages it is becoming more and more difficult. In Vlad-
imir Dahl’s Explanatory Dictionary of the Living Great Russian Language we 
will find an understanding of such terms as nasilit, nasilovat, nasilivat, which 
imply the following meanings: to force, to compel, to force something, to con-
strain. There are also terms nasilie and nasilstvo: coercion, captivity, need of force, 
illegal and arbitrary action. And also: arbitrariness, life under oppression, con-
trol or keep in submission by force (violence) (Даль 1905: 1218). We have singled 
out those meanings which already initially contain some intuitive philosophical 
connotations. First, it is obvious that negative assessments do not prevail here. 
Second, there remains the meaning of “coercion” and “unfreedom” (captivity). 
Third, there is a connection with everyday resentment and “constraint”, “ille-
gality” and “domination” (life under oppression), and, finally, with pragmatic 
management. As we can see, the “great and mighty” Russian language as the 
“house of being” (Heidegger) contains many concealed meanings and at the 
same time it opens up a large space for our categorization.
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In English, some semantic work was done earlier by H. Arendt, who wrote: 
“It is, I think, a rather sad reflection on the present state of political science that 
our terminology does not distinguish among such key words as ‘power’, ‘strength’, 
‘force’, ‘authority’, and, finally, ‘violence’ – all of which refer to distinct, differ-
ent phenomena and would hardly exist unless they did. (...) Force, which we of-
ten use in daily speech as a synonym for violence, especially if violence serves 
as a means of coercion, should be reserved, in terminological language, for the 
‘forces of nature’ or the ‘force of circumstances’ (la force des choses), that is, to 
indicate the energy released by physical or social movements” (Arendt 1970: 50, 
52, 53, 54). However, we were embarrassed here by the technological and in-
strumental understanding of violence and its identification solely with power. 
Even Foucault, despite his Nietzschean passion for “power”, demarcated “vio-
lence” and “power” (Фуко 2006: 180), recognizing as the main sign of violence 
the objectification of any influence as opposed to free, subjective existence.
In the aspect we are interested in, H. Hofmeister quite consistently tried 
to connect the interpretation of violence with the concept of “force”, starting 
with the problematization of the meaning of the concepts presented in “The 
German Dictionary of the Brothers Grimm”, and ending with the Indo-Euro-
pean and ancient origins. He wrote, noting the connection between violence 
and “force”, which “acts as violence only under certain conditions”: “The Ger-
man word ‘violence’ (Gewalt), which is derived from the Indo-Germanic root 
val – ‘to be strong’ – implies ‘to have the ability to dispose’. Initially, i.e. in an-
cient German language, the word ‘violence’ was not a legal term: it was used in 
an area of freedom where there was no place for law. Later on, ‘violence’ was 
used to translate such Latin notions as violentia (riot, unrestraint), vis (power, 
might) and potestas (power, potential, domination). Since in the Middle Ages 
the word potestas was most often translated by the German word ‘power’, ‘vi-
olence’ received a stronger meaning violentia” (Хофмайстер 2006: 31–32). 
Here, there appear some different meanings from the Russian ones: might (al-
though moshch in Russian also means both might and ability to do something) 
and, most importantly, potential. The latter is very important, because it is 
from this categorical point of view of potentiality, the path of violence into the 
reality of human existence begins. 
Thus, we find ourselves in difficulty, because we intuitively feel the generic 
load of the concept of “power”, which is constantly being either marginal or phil-
osophically excluded. The new appeal to Russian linguistic thesauruses has shown 
that in the Vladimir Dahl’s Explanatory Dictionary of the Living Great Russian 
Language the spectrum of meanings of the term “power” turns out to be wider, 
including also “violence” (Даль 1909: 152–154), and even more diverse than in 
the dictionary of the Grimm brothers: it contains both numerous connotations 
related to “natural forces and causes” and “vital forces”, and spiritual ones – sila 
dukhovnaja (spiritual force), sila uma (mental force), sila voli (willpower), sila 
nravstvennaja (moral force), moch (might), moguta (ability), sposobnost (potential). 
And, equally important, it points to the ontological aspects of “power”: ways, 
means, essence of the concept, etc. There are also very important meanings of 
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“power” – vlast (might), mogushchestvo (potency), vlijanje (influence), vladychestvo 
(domination), vojsko (army), armija (forces), rat (warrior host); this suggests that 
power itself may include power phenomena, which also constitute a wider class 
of phenomena than violence in general, and the more so legitimate violence.
As a generic concept of “power” in relation to “violence” I. A. Ilyin for the 
first time clearly indicated in his “apprentice” article “Concepts of Law and 
Power (Essay of Methodological Analysis)” (1910), which also received Eu-
ropean recognition. In this article, he gave a subtle philosophical concept of 
“force”, different from Hegel’s one in the Philosophy of Right, but based on the 
history of philosophy (although he also allowed for the Kantian logic) (В. П. 
Римский, О. Н. Римская, Мюльгаупт 2018). I. A. Ilyin noted the ontological 
status of the power of Kraft in contrast to the gnoseological Macht, relying on 
Leibniz, Spinoza and Fichte (Ильин 1994). The ontology of power as an ability, 
i.e. potency, he clearly ascended to Hegel, and through his works to Aristotle.
Hegel in his historical and philosophical lectures wrote, highlighting a spe-
cial, actually original place in the Aristotelian discourse of the categories of 
potency (dynamis, ability, possibility, strength) and energy (act, realization of 
force, activity, necessity, expediency, reality): “To proceed, there are two lead-
ing forms, which Aristotle characterizes as that of potentiality (δύναμις) and that 
of actuality (ενέργεια); the latter is still more closely charac terized as entelechy 
(εντελέχεια) or free activity, which has the end (το τέλος) in itself, and is the real-
ization of this end. These are determinations which occur repeatedly in Aris-
totle, especially in the ninth book of the Metaphysics, and which we must be 
familiar with, if we would understand him” (Hegel 1894: 138). Although Hegel 
further reduces the hermeneutic tension of the “dynamis” concept: “With Ar-
istotle δύναμις does not therefore mean force (for force is really an imperfect 
aspect of form), but rather capacity which is not even undetermined possibil-
ity; ενέργεια is, on the other hand, pure, spontaneous activity. These definitions 
were of importance throughout all the middle ages” (ibid: 138–139). I. A. Ilyin, 
criticizing the Hegelian understanding of “power”, both in his early article and 
in the book “On Resisting Evil by Force” (Ильин 1996), developed his own 
meanings of force and violence, coercion and non-resistance, etc.
All of this allowed us to join thesis of H. Hofmeister: “Power is not violence 
and authority, but in turn, neither violence nor authority can be thought of 
without power” (Хофмайстер 2006: 34, 36). And then he had interesting ref-
erences to antiquity, to Aristotle. 
The understanding of the phenomenon of violence in ancient culture and 
philosophy, in our opinion, should be preceded by the understanding that the 
usual meanings of many concepts used by modern researchers in their interpre-
tation, were developed in the modern era. It should be taken into account that 
they are a kind of background for perception of this problem when analyzing 
and interpreting other historical epochs and cultural and civilizational worlds. 
In our case, it was necessary to identify cultural paradigms and philosophi-
cal images of violence not so much to reveal their authentic meaning inherent 
in antiquity, as to find the boundaries of the meaning field of the phenomenon 
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itself outside its cultural and historical variability, taken in its universality as 
an archetypical meaning in human life.
In the classical antique polis, we have completely new, syncretic cultural 
practices of regulating the “zoon”, the “naked life” of a person, the practice of 
integrating it into the “bios”, into the good, “nomothetic” solidary life of the po-
lis, which do not exclude “polytheistic” forms of violence (freely accepted le-
gitimate violence) and the authoritative control of the life of “free multitude,” 
which implies the emergence of moral-legal and religious-moral public forms 
of freedom and polis solidarity, “solidarity practices,” as conditions of person-
al “practices of self” (Foucault), new forms of man’s cognition of himself and 
self-control. In classical antiquity, the basic principles of opposing the prac-
tices of legitimate violence to “practices of self”, non-violence in the face of a 
universal “person” of the state and incipient legal violence are affirmed, which 
retains its cultural and cognitive value today. Not abstract “non-violence”, but 
legitimate practices of power tame illegal violence.
A symbolic event that influenced the ancient understanding of violence and 
non-violence in human life and the ancient polis was the execution of Socrates, 
who not only became a personified archetype and image of ancient thought 
(νοῦς), conscience and freedom, but also a “sacred figure of violence”, along 
with Jesus Christ, in the history of Western culture and philosophy. Socrates 
could have avoided death, as it was customary in the “legal practice” of the 
ancient polis, by persuading the court to expel himself from the polis: “Exile? 
for perhaps you might accept that assessment” (Apol. 37c) (Платон 1997). And 
he chooses death and rejects expulsion by “free decision”. Why? Because for a 
free citizen of polis  to be in exile meant not only the loss of some sentimental 
“motherland” or “fatherland” (female and male versions of the policy nom-
ination, which bothered Heidegger so much), not just the acquisition of the 
status of a metic with no rights in the “other’s polis”, and not even a return to 
“naked life”, but the transformation into a homo sacer (Agamben), which could 
not even be sacrificed, but anyone could have simply killed him. This is how 
Socrates perceived his possible “exile”, who had not left his “homeland”, had 
not left his “homeland”, preferring to constantly fly from “naked life” (private) 
to βίος, “political life” (public), annoying the Athenians as a gadfly, and urging 
them to return to the path of “self-care” (Apol. 30b, 30e, 36e–d). 
The hermeneutics of the texts of ancient philosophers makes it possible to 
draw a conclusion (В. П. Римский, О. Н. Римская, К. Е. Мюльгаупт 2019) 
that the concepts of “violence” and “coercion” (or similar in meaning catego-
ries and images) are often used by them as synonyms and not only axiologi-
cally, but also ontologically. “Non-violence” as such is virtually absent in their 
texts, but close meanings could probably be defined in the analysis of the phe-
nomenon that “freedom” was in antiquity. Special translation and interpreta-
tion procedures are needed to avoid modernizing ancient meanings, but this 
is only possible in a special, separate study.
The reference to Aristotle’s philosophy is of the greatest interest to us in 
terms of philosophical and ontological understanding and theoretical resolution 
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of the dichotomy of violence and non-violence. Aristotle was credited with 
being the first in ancient philosophy to consider the category of “power” as 
“ancestral” to both “violence” and “non-violence” (a point that was actually 
missed by both Hegel and contemporary authors). Why is it in Aristotle’s phi-
losophy that the problem of violence arises in ontological terms? It is because 
it is in the life of polis that ethic and legal and political practices act for the 
first time as an effective force regulating violence and asserting non-violence 
in the solidarity life of “free multitude”.
This is how Aristotle, or rather Russian translations and interpretations of 
Aristotle, found themselves in the hermeneutics of violence and non-violence, 
violence and power.
Let us start actually with the first “Russian Aristotle”, or rather with the 
Russian reading of Aristotle, which made a contribution to the young V. V. 
Rozanov after the publication of his treatise “On Understanding”, still not 
recognized as hermeneutic and invaluable. In a letter to N. N. Strakhov dated 
February 15, 1988, Rozanov writes: “For the last 2 years, looking at different 
works, (...) I came to the conviction, perhaps, to the guess that the root of the 
case, the key to solving a lot of issues, which for me – either to solve or not to 
live, lies with Aristotle” (Розанов 2001: 153). N. N. Strakhov, in his correspon-
dence, was somewhat sceptical about Aristotle’s Russian relevance and topical-
ity, although Rozanov’s translation was perceived as some cultural act, having 
assisted in its publication. And, nevertheless, already in the 1913 note to N. N. 
Strakhov’s letter of February 23, 1988, as if continuing the dispute, Rozanov 
notes: “And I still think that Aristotle cannot be replaced by anyone” (ibid: 9).
It also contains a very remarkable opinion of Rozanov about the place of 
dynamis and energeia in Aristotle’s category: “[T]he concepts of δύναμις and 
ενέργεια in their Latin terms potentia and actus (I do not really understand only 
actus; in my work, I always spoke about the potential and reality; it is true that 
it corresponds to my ‘forming existence’, but we did not reach it in Metaphys-
ics) are the key to understanding the most complex and deepest systems of 
philosophy. In them, as in mysterious symbols, the whole system of thought 
is expressed, and it became clear thus-and-so (the main thing is the change)” 
(ibid: 154). And in the next letter of March 2, 1988, about his translation and 
interpretation of Aristotle, he continues his thought: “I want to get acquainted 
with his works in order to get acquainted with his notions of potentialities (this 
is the most important thing), which he was the first to introduce into philoso-
phy and has probably already developed well” (ibid: 160). In the preface to the 
publication of the translation of Metaphysics Rozanov wrote: “Amazing thing: 
after two millennia, which separate us from the time of Aristotle’s life, science 
is worried about the concept, as recently acquired, and, of course, more sci-
entifically arranged, but which, however, was first discovered by Aristotle: we 
understand the concept of physical energy, which now replaces so long domi-
nant concept of force and was first established by Aristotle in immortal terms 
δύναμις and ενέργεια, possibility and reality, tension and action.” (ibid: 25) No one 
has really appreciated this Rosanov’s hermeneutics of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 
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yet, although it is very important for the actual understanding of the ancient 
meanings of the phenomenon of violence, among other things.
Therefore, we were surprised by Aristotle’s new translations, which reduce 
the flexibility of the ancient Greek language, which is related to Russian and 
German, to a primitive modernizing analytic approach. So, for example, A. V. 
Markov, quite consciously, not only limits the meanings of Aristotle δύναμις and 
ενέργεια, but simply distorts them, as well as other categories: “Therefore, let 
the reader not be surprised that I often translate ‘logos’ as ‘formula’ (and ‘pro-
portion’ sometimes, in Kubitsky’s case it is ‘definition’), ‘atom’ as ‘individual’, 
‘genesis’ as ‘production’; I explain ‘art’ as ‘cooking’ several times; I translate 
‘energy’ only as ‘reality’, and after the poets and prose writers of the Russian XX 
century I prefer the word ‘existence’ to the word ‘essence’” (Аристотель 2018: 
8). It is natural that Markov’s translation of Aristotle Metaphysics received fair 
criticism from specialists (Юнусов 2018). Trying to actualize Aristotle’s dic-
tionary and preserving its identity at the same time, as if bringing it closer to 
the language of “Mandelstam and Pasternak, Platonov and Nabokov”, Markov 
does not understand that it is impossible to combine the innovative Nabokov 
language or avant-garde Pasternak language with the consciously archaized 
style of Platonov or Mandelstam. As it is difficult to combine the actualization 
of Aristotle language with the restoration of its archaic primordial meanings.
M. Heidegger will speak and write on the actualizing reading of Aristotle 
with the simultaneous restoration of the original identity (but only after Rozanov 
for almost thirty-five years!). Heidegger’s “romance with Aristotle” began early: 
even at the time of his studies at the theological faculty. But it was in lectures 
at the faculty of philosophy that he urged students to turn to Aristotle from the 
present and to return to the ancient meanings of his concepts, which did not 
mean, however, some modernization of ancient philosophy. Rather, it meant 
archaizing modern (relevant) philosophy, searching through the restoration of 
the original meanings a specific philosophical language lost by modernist phi-
losophy and translation modernization. And then he translates δύναμις, meaning 
in modern German Vermögen, Kraft, Fähigkeit (ability, power, opportunity), as 
das bestimmte Verfügenkönnen über; Bereitschaft zu ... (a certain ability to con-
trol; readiness for ...) (Хайдеггер 2012: 210). One can be amazed at how bizarre 
Heidegger translations are, but at the same time he solved the mystification 
tasks of constructing his adequate philosophical language by reading the the-
saurus of the philosophy of antiquity, but he did not impose any modernizing 
meanings or avant-garde translations on the ancients language.
No, we are surprised by another fact: how the Greek δύναμις, used for the 
traditional translation of the Aristotelian interpretation of the category of op-
portunity, has lost the connotations of power (movement, ability, function); in 
turn, “power” has lost touch with “violence” (bia) and “necessity”. An appeal 
to the categorization of violence and power by Aristotle, we believe, should 
begin with reading his treatise Physics (Аристотель 1981a), where we find such 
an initial categorical disposition and connection δύναμις as power with motion. 
An appeal to the treatises On the Heavens and Metaphysics (Аристотель 1981c; 
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1981b; 2006) allows us to expand the Aristotelian connotations δύναμις not only 
as “opportunities”, but also as “forces”, and in the interpretation of ενέργεια to 
get away from its understanding as only “reality”, connecting both with “ac-
tion”, “necessity”, and with “violence.” At the same time, supposedly “outdat-
ed” Russian translations do not bother us.
In his treatise On the Heavens Aristotle, criticizing the Pythagorean “string 
theory”, writes: “But if the moving bodies are so great, and the sound which 
penetrates to us is proportionate to their size, that sound must needs reach us 
in an intensity many times that of thunder, and the force of its action must be 
immense. Indeed the reason why we do not hear, and show in our bodies none 
of the effects of violent force, is easily given: it is that there is no noise” (De 
Cael. II, 9, 291a, 2-7; italics ours). And further he makes a conclusion that none 
of the “stars” “moves neither as an animal, nor violently, by force” (II, 9, 291a, 
2-7; II, 14, 296 b, 25-30; italics ours). Strength and violence are discussed here 
in an inseparable connection with “naturalness” as well as with “necessity”.
But what meanings does Aristotle put into “violence” and “forced move-
ment”? The movement “as an animal” obviously presupposes some kind of 
“organicity”, “self-movement”, but “violence” means “unnaturalness” and “co-
ercion”. This is also confirmed by other texts.
Here is a detailed Aristotelian understanding of naturalness: “The necessity 
that each of the simple bodies should have a natural movement may be shown 
as follows. They manifestly move, and if they have no proper movement they 
must move by constraint; and the constrained is the same as the unnatural. 
Now an unnatural movement presupposes a natural movement which it con-
travenes, and which, however many the unnatural movements, is always one. 
(...) The same may be shown from the fact of rest. Rest, also, must either be 
constrained or natural, constrained in a place to which movement was con-
strained, natural in a place to which movement was natural. Now manifestly 
there is a body which is at rest at the centre. If then this rest is natural to it, 
clearly motion to this place is natural to it. If, on the other hand, its rest is con-
strained, what is hindering its motion? Something, perhaps, which is at rest; 
but if so, we shall simply repeat the same argument; and either we shall come 
to an ultimate something to which rest where it is natural, or we shall have an 
infinite process, which is impossible. (...) For to traverse an infinite is impos-
sible, and impossibilities do not happen. So the moving thing must stop some-
where, and there rest not by constraint but naturally” (De Cael. II, 14, 300а, 
20–30; 300b, 5–7; italics ours) (Аристотель 1981c). But the Russian word est-
estvennoe (natural) carries the meanings of “existence”, “being”, “what exists”, 
and the opposite protivoestestvennoe (unnatural) means “what does not exist”, 
“non-existent”, which obviously leads us to negative attributes of violence, to 
its non-existence, not-being, and destruction.
In this sense, unnaturalness is again associated with an action, activity or 
movement, the nature of which is revealed by the reading and interpretation 
of Metaphysics: “We call the necessary (1) that without which, as a condition, a 
thing cannot live (...). The compulsory and compulsion, i.e. that which impedes 
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and hinders contrary to impulse and choice. For the compulsory is called nec-
essary (...). And compulsion is a form of necessity (...). And necessity is held to 
be something that cannot be persuaded (as a Fate) – and rightly, for it is con-
trary to the movement which accords with choice and with reasoning (...). For 
as regards the compulsory we say that it is necessary to act or to be acted on, 
only when we cannot act according to impulse because of the compelling force, 
– which implies that necessity is that because of which the thing cannot be 
otherwise; and similarly as regards the conditions of life and of good, when in 
the one case good, in the other life and being, are not possible without certain 
conditions, these are necessary, and this cause is a kind of necessity” (Met. V, 
5, 1015a, 20–34; 1015b, 1–8; italics ours).
Violence is understood here as such a necessity, which is connected with 
the suppression of freedom (“one’s own decision”), something “hindering de-
sire” (“realization of one’s own will”) and contrary to “common sense”, as well 
as the absence of “good”. Violence is not only presented as “necessity” in the 
ontological sense, but also existentially, as the opposite of “good” and “desire”. 
And “necessity” acts as fatal and inevitable, like the goddess of Destiny or Des-
tiny itself. Further, Aristotle (in Book V, Chapter 12) considers “suffering” in 
connection with “ability” or “opportunity” (dynamis) as “scarcity”, “depriva-
tion” and “lack of ability”. It is unclear why the translator chose to translate 
dynamis here as an “possibility” rather than a “power”? Power remains in the 
shadow of “necessity” as “possibility”, “potential energy” and “movement”, and 
violence loses the resulting opposition in ontological meaning.
Let us turn to Chapter V of Metaphysics, translated by P. D. Pervov and V. 
V. Rozanov, and compare them. And here we will see the meanings already 
revealed by us earlier. “(I)t has something, sometimes because it is deprived of 
something; but if privation is in a sense having, everything will be capable by 
having something, so that things are capable both by having something, i.e. a 
principle, and by having the privation of the positive principle, if it is possible 
to have a privation; and if privation is not in a sense having, things are called 
capable homonymously); and a thing is capable in another sense because nei-
ther any other thing, nor itself qua other, has a capacity or principle which can 
destroy it. Again, all these are capable either merely because the thing might 
chance to happen or not to happen, or because it might do so well. (...). Inca-
pacity is privation of capacity – i.e. of such a principle as has been described 
– either in general or in the case of something that would naturally have the 
capacity, or even at the time when it would naturally already have it” (Met. V, 
12, 1019 b, 5-20; italics ours). The used phrases “desroy”, “privation of capaci-
ty” again turns out to be close with nasilie (violence) as something that is ne/
sushchee (something that does not exist), nebytie (not-being) and gibel (death). 
Once again, there is a certain “not-being”, but there is no power as a charac-
teristic of being, which is necessary not even for the second position, but for 
the first one in this categorical pair of power – violence.
These meanings and the need for “power” as coming from possibility to 
reality arise further (Met. Book IX, Chapter 1). Aristotle himself refers to these 
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meanings (Metaphysics, V, 12), but the translator again does not use the word 
“сила” (power) persistently, although Stagirite writes: “We have pointed out 
elsewhere that ‘potentiality’ and the word ‘can’ have several senses” (Meta-
physics, IX, 1, 1046а, 5). Whereas moch (or moshch) in Russian means “power” 
(vozmoch – to be able to do something, and prevozmoch – to overcome, to pass 
to the reality). Such a reading, which implies the power of a stronger category 
of force, makes it obvious that the dialectics of force and violence are revealed 
through the opposition of ability/inability; violence/non-violence.
Thus, we can find all the meanings we are interested in from Aristotle, 
among which the category of dynamis can be interpreted as a force, and the 
category of power as violence (bia) which is associated with the categories of 
opportunity and necessity. Possible power as an ability in the context of nat-
urality (prirodnost) and necessity is put into the context of naturalness (estest-
vennost) as strength and unnaturalness as violence; they are two equally pos-
sible aspects of being. Unnaturalness is such a being, which is connected with 
necessity as coercion, distortion of natural, natural good or some “capturabili-
ty” of force. As a result, there is a collision between “action” (energeia, power) 
and “counter-action” (violence) as a “natural” or “free” force and an “usurped” 
force, violence itself as an usurpation of “own decision”.
Of course, the “Russian reading” of Aristotle should be supplemented with 
new translations and actualizing interpretations, similar to what Rozanov did 
in his time, and, if it is possible, to what Heidegger did in the twenties of the 
last century, as well as the retrospective analysis of the Greek text through the 
use of the modern thesaurus, “clouds” of actual today’s meanings, texts and 
authors. So Walter Benjamin, who has once again become popular today with 
his concept of “divine violence”, raises the question whether Aristotle’s play 
of power and opportunity has something that does not include violence and 
is absolutely “non-violent”.
And Aristotle answers him: “Now some things owe their necessity to some-
thing other than themselves; others do not, while they are the source of neces-
sity in other things. Therefore the necessary in the primary and strict sense is 
the simple; for this does not admit of more states than one, so that it does not 
admit even of one state and another; for it would thereby admit of more than 
one. If, then, there are certain eternal and unmovable things, nothing compul-
sory or against their nature attaches to them” (Met. V, 5, 1015b, 9–15; italics 
ours). Only God is not subject to violence as he is the most “simple”, “simple 
force”, “primary power” and “first cause”: “And life also belongs to God; for the 
actuality of thought is life, and God is that actuality; and God’s essential actu-
ality is life most good and eternal. We say therefore that God is a living being, 
eternal, most good, so that life and duration continuous and eternal belong to 
God; for this is God” (Met. XII, 7, 1072b, 25-30). God as a true being is violent/
non-violent absolute. There remains one step to Walter Benjamin (Беньямин 
2012: 8) with his “divine violence”.
Translated by M. A. Maydanskiy
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Hermeneutika prevođenja i razumevanje nasilja
Apstrakt
Filozofska definicija nasilja danas je „nepotpuna“ i ostavlja „jaz“ između fenomena i pojma. 
To je slučaj usled činjenice da je pojam „nasilja“ (bio) uključen u opštu filozofsku kategorijal-
nu liniju na čudan način. U domaćem i Zapadnom diskursu problemsko polje nasilja sadrži 
pre svega politička i etička značenja. Problem se intuitivno rešava apelovanjem na pojam 
„moći“ za koji se ispostavlja da je filozofski izubljen u modernoj filozofiji. Samo u izuzetnim 
slučajevima pronalazimo „tragove“ tog filozofskog pojma. Među njima su Aristotelova dela 
koja se moraju osloboditi modernih izobličavajućih tumačenja. Dakle, u prevodima Aristote-
la, grčko δύναμις, koje se tradicionalno koristilo za prenošenje kategorije mogućnosti, izgu-
bilo je svoje značenje sile (kretanje, mogućnost, sposobnost, funkcija); zauzvrat, „sila“ je 
 izgubila svoju vezu za „nasiljem“ (βια) i „nužnošću“. Nasilje se tako shvata kao oblik nužnosti 
koji je povezan sa potiskivanjem „sopstvene odluke“, slobode, nečim što „sprečava želju“, i u 
suprotnosti sa „uobičajenim mišljenjem“ i kao odsustvo „dobra“. Nasilje je predstavljeno ne 
samo u ontološkom smislu, već i egzistencijalno, kao suprotnost „dobru“ i nečijoj vlastitoj 
„želji“. Sila ostaje u senci „nužnosti“ kao „mogućnosti“, „potencijalne energije“ i „kretanja“, i 
nasilje gubi opoziciju koja nastaje u ontološkom modalitetu. 
Ključne reči: hermeneutika, mogućnost, sila, moć, realnost, akcija, nasilje, nužnost, prisila, 
Aristotel, V. Rozanov, I. Iljin, M. Hajdeger  
